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An Unfulfilled Promise of The Medicaid
Act: Enforcing Medicaid Recipients' Right
To Health Care
By Frederick H. Cohen*

I. Introduction
The Medicaid Act ("Act") requires that states provide all
Medicaid recipients with access to health care that is equal to the
access enjoyed by privately insured individuals.' The Act requires
that states go even further with respect to children, mandating that
states conduct aggressive outreach and education to insure that
children on Medicaid actually receive adequate and timely health
care. Many states are denying these rights, leaving it to private
litigants and the courts to enforce these mandates. This article
describes the state of the law regarding the Medicaid Act's Equal
Access provisions, including a discussion of the Act's section that
grants children the right to have access to health care that is equal to
that of the generally insured population. This article also explores the
methods by which states should ensure that "equal access" exists.
This article then discusses the children-specific Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment ("EPSDT") provisions,
including the particular services that children should receive under
these provisions and the methods by which states should insure that
the services are provided. The article concludes with commentary on
the manner in which these provisions can be and have been enforced.

* Frederick H. Cohen is a partner in the Litigation Group of Goldberg, Kohn,
Bell, Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd. in Chicago. He served as lead trial counsel
in the landmark victory of Memisovski v. Patla, 92 C 1982, which was tried in the
Northern District of Illinois. See Memisovski v. Maram, 2004 WL 1878332 (2004).
He has extensive experience in litigating complex cases, including health care and
class action cases. See http://www.goldbergkohn.com for a more complete
biography for Mr. Cohen.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965) (originally enacted as Social Security Amendments
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286).
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II. The Federal Medicaid Program
The Medicaid program provides federal funds to states that2
choose to provide medical services to low-income individuals.
Participation in the program is voluntary, but once a state opts to
participate, it must comply with the Act and with the regulations
promulgated by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS"), a part of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS").3 To qualify for federal
reimbursement, the Act requires each state to submit its Medicaid
plan to the federal government. 4 This plan is a comprehensive written
statement submitted by the agency describing the nature and scope of
its Medicaid program and giving assurance that it will be
administered in conformity with the specific requirements of federal
law.5
CMS has promulgated a State Medicaid Manual that is an
authoritative explanation of what the Medicaid statute and regulations6
require the states to do in implementing the Medicaid program.
Likewise, letters written by the Director of CMS, commonly referred
to as "State Medicaid Letters," provide states with direction and
interpretive guidance in the operation of state Medicaid programs. 7
Although states may contract with private and public health care
providers to deliver the panoply of services guaranteed under the
Medicaid program, states retain ultimate responsibility to ensure8
compliance with the Medicaid Act in providing adequate health care.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).
' 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1965); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502

2

(1990).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a).
42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (1988).
6 THE

STATE

MEDICAID

MANUAL

available

at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smm/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004); see also Ind. Family and SocialServices Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d
476, 482 (7th Cir. 2002); Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1974).
7 Slekis v. Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999); T.L. v. Colo. Dep't. of Health Care
Policy and Fin., 42 P.3d 63, 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
8 See Carr v. Wilson-Coker, 203 F.R.D. 66, 75 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 2001)
("Although the state contracts with MCO's... its duties relative to ensuring that
the plaintiffs receive medical services with reasonable promptness are nondelegable."); J.K. By and Through R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 699
(D.Ariz. 1993) ("It is patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would permit
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A. States Must Provide Medicaid Recipients With Access To
Medical Care That Is Equal To The Generally Insured
Population.
1. Legal Requirement For "Equal Access"
The Medicaid Act requires that individuals on Medicaid have
access to care that is "equal" to the care available to individuals who
have other forms of health insurance. Specifically, the Medicaid Act
provides that each state's Medicaid Plan must:
[P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the
utilization of, and the payment for, care and services
available under the plan ...

as may be necessary to...

assure that payments are consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the
geographic area. 9
This is commonly referred to as the "Equal Access"
provision.' 0 In passing the Equal Access provision, Congress
explained that it was responding to attempts by states to improperly
limit provider reimbursement rates as "one method of controlling
program costs."" Congress concluded that, "[w]ithout adequate
payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect physicians to
participate in the program."
a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its obligations to a
private entity. The law demands that the designated single state Medicaid agency
must oversee and remain accountable for uniform statewide utilization review
procedures conforming to bona fide standards of medical necessity.") (internal
citations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A).
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
6402(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)) (adding the requirement that
payments to providers are "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.").
9

10

" H.R. REP. No. 101-247 at 390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2116.
12 Id.
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The proper analysis of "Equal Access" involves a comparison
of the access to care of Medicaid beneficiaries "to the access of other
individuals in the same geographic area with private or public
insurance coverage. ' 3 The uninsured are not part of the analysis.'n
2. The Equal Access Provision Requires an Analysis of Rates
And Access
The key to determining whether a state is complying with the
Equal Access provision is "to check predictions against reality" by
monitoring the rates and the resultinF access to care and then make
adjustments if the care is insufficient.
The Equal Access provision "requires each state to produce a
result." The Seventh Circuit in Methodist Hospitals'6 explained that
[u]nder [the equal access provision] ...states may behave

like other buyers of goods and services in the marketplace:
they may say what they are willing to pay and see whether
this brings forth an adequate supply. If not, the state may
(and under § 1396a(a)(30), must) raise the price until the
market clears.17
Thus, the Act requires that states monitor access after rates
are set; the court noted with approval that Indiana, the defendant
state, did this with "studies" and with rate-revisions to address
13

H.R. REP. No. 101-247 at 390-91 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1906, 2116.
14 See Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1993) (
"...
[T]o construe the language 'general population' to include the uninsured
members of the population would be directly contrary to the intent of the Medicaid
statute .... To suggest that Congress appropriated vast sums of money and enacted
a huge bureaucratic structure to ensure that recipients of the federal Medicaid
program have equivalent access to medical services as their uninsured neighbors
(i.e. close to none) is ridiculous. Congress must have meant that Medicaid
recipients are entitled to access equal to that of the insured population." ); see
Memisovski v. Patla, 2004 WL 1878332, at *42 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (in determining
the level of access enjoyed by the general population, the court focuses solely on
access to care by the insured).
15 Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996); Am.
Soc'y of Consultant Pharm. v. Garner, 180 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973-74 (N.D. Ill.

2001).
16 Methodist Hosps., 91
17

F.3d at 1030.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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problems with access that the studies revealed. 18 It suggests that
evidence of the withdrawal of providers from the system and of
complaints by those affected would also be persuasive.1 9 Methodist
Hospitals mandates that states monitor and adjust rates according to
the level of access being produced; it suggests ways of doing this and
affirms that assessing the efficacy of the state's methods and results
is properly within the competence of a court.2 °
In cases where there is a challenge by recipients to the
adequacy of the state's monitoring of access to care under existing
rates, there are several factors a court may consider to evaluate
whether a state has complied with the Equal Access provision: (a) the
level of reimbursement to participating physicians in the context of
the market and the cost of providing services; (b) the level of
physician participation in the Medicaid program and whether
providers are opting out of or restricting their Medicaid caseloads; (c)
whether there is a stream of reports that recipients are having
difficulty obtaining care; (d) whether the rate at which Medicaid
recipients utilize healthcare services is lower than the rate at which
the generally insured population uses those services; and (e) whether
defendants have admitted that reimbursement rates are inadequate. 2 '
In analyzing the adequacy of reimbursement levels, a court
should consider the state's rate compared to what practitioners
actually charge, and the adequacy of the rate to cover overhead or the
cost of rendering services plus some marginal profit. 22 As recognized
by the Clark court,
18 Id.
19 Id.

20 Id. See generally, Methodist Hosps., 91 F.3d at 1027; Am. Soc'y, 180 F.
Supp. 2d at 956, 962-963 (involving challenges by health care providers to
proposed rate decreases). In those cases, the courts were presented with only the
providers' predictions of adverse impact on recipients' access to care. Neither case
presented a challenge by recipients to the adequacy of the access to care under
existing rates---that is, the question of whether current rates have produced the
requisite equal access. Challenges to proposed rates are inherently more difficult
because there is obviously less empirical evidence of the impact of the rates on
access.
21 See Memisovski 2004 WL 1878332, at *76-77 (N.D. 111. 2004); Clark, 758
F. Supp. at 575-78.
22 Clark. 758 F. Supp at 577; see also Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houston, 171
F.3d 842, 854-55 (3rd Cir. 1999) (evaluating reimbursement rate levels should
include consideration of whether the rate the state arrived at "would allow
[providers] to maintain provision of care and earn a profit.").
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the focus of the law is on the State's ability to encourage
participation by setting adequate reimbursement rates.
Although other factors may affect provider participation,
the statute directs the State's attention to reimbursement
levels. Regardless of the interplay of other factors, if the
reimbursement levels are not enough to ensure equal access
to... care, then the State has failed in its statutory duty.23
In measuring the level of physician participation, a court may
consider: (i) the extent to which participating practitioners serve
Medicaid patients; and (ii) the percentage of licensed practitioners
who see 24every Medicaid patient who present themselves for
treatment.
Separate from a showing that reimbursement rate levels are
insufficient to ensure Equal Access, a violation of Equal Access can
also be established where the reimbursement rates for physicians in
the Medicaid program are arbitrary and capricious based on how they
were adopted or their level compared to objective benchmarks. 5
Where a state's methodology for adopting rates is found to be
arbitrary and capricious, the resulting rates may be held invalid under
equal access.2 6

Under the Equal Access provision, no particular rate-setting
method or rate is mandated. 27 But whatever method the state employs
or rate it arrives at must comply with the general obligation not to be
arbitrary and capricious. 28 Specifically with respect to Medicaid ratesetting, factors identified by the court in Rite Aid appropriate for
determining whether the rate is arbitrary and capricious include: (i)
whether, "by considering [a] study and other sources of information,
23 Clark, 758 F. Supp. at 576-77; see also Memisovski 2004 WL 1878332, at
*77 ("Rates and equal access simply cannot be divorced.").

24

Id.

25 See Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 853 ("We may find that an action is arbitrary and
capricious if, the agency relied on factors other than those intended by Congress,
did not consider an important aspect of the issue confronting the agency, provided
an explanation for its decision which runs counter to the evidence before the
agency or is entirely implausible."); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-41 (1983).
26 id.
27

Methodist Hosps., 91 F.3d at 1030.

2'Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 853; see also Am. Soc'y of Consultant Pharm., 180 F.

Supp. 2d at 976 (acknowledging that an arbitrary and capricious rate could run
afoul of Methodist Hospitals).
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[the state] made a reasonable effort to anticipate the effects of its
action"; and (ii) whether the rate the state arrived at "would
allow
29
[providers] to maintain provision of care and earn a profit.,
B. States Must Provide "Early And Periodic Screening, Diagnosis
And Treatment"
As discussed above, Medicaid recipients have a right to Equal
Access. This right is passive; although individuals on Medicaid have
a right to have access to care, they must choose whether and how to
take advantage of that care. Congress decided that children also
should enjoy the right to Equal Access, and moreover that additional
protections were necessary for children. Accordingly, Congress
enacted the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment
("EPSDT") provisions of the Medicaid Act to 3insure
that children
0
actually receive the care that is available to them.
1. The Medicaid Act Requires That States Provide EPSDT
The Medicaid Act and its regulations set forth a broad and
detailed list of services that a state program must provide to
children. 3 ' Specifically, the Medicaid Act mandates that a state
program provide that children receive: (i) regular healthcare
screening services (i.e., well-child exams and immunizations); (ii)
effective diagnosis of any conditions that need treatment; and (iii)
treatment for any such conditions. 32 The statute refers to these
services as "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
services," and they are commonly known by their acronym,
EPSDT.33 Defined at 42 U.S.C. section 1396d(r), EPSDT includes

29

Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 854-55.

30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) ("A state plan for medical
assistance
must.., provide for making medical assistance available [to eligible persons],
including at least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) ...of
section 1396(a) of this title... ");see also, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (stating that
"medical assistance means.., early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and
treatment services (as defined in subsection (r) of this section) for individuals who
are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21.").

3"42 U.S.C. § 1396; 42 C.F.R. § 430.
32 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).
42

U.S.C. § 1396d(r); 42 C.F.R. § 441.56.
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several types of services. 34 For example, screening services include
comprehensive medical and developmental histories of both physical
and mental health, comprehensive unclothed examinations,
tests-including lead blood level testsimmunizations, laboratory
35
education.
health
and
EPSDT also includes vision, dental, and hearing screens and
diagnosis. The children are entitled to age appropriate vision and
hearing screening; risk assessment, such as mental health and
substance abuse screening as appropriate; developmental screening
and referrals for
and assessment as needed; and oral health screenings
36
dental care and other needed medical services.
2. EPSDT Services Must Be Provided On a Timely Basis
The Medicaid Act requires that EPSDT services be performed
at intervals that meet reasonable standards of medical and dental
practice.37 The Medicaid regulations refer to this required schedule of
periodic examinations, tests and services as a periodicity schedule,
and they instruct the states to implement one in consultation with
medical provider groups that specialize in providing healthcare to
children. The periodicity schedule must specify the screening
services applicable "at each stage of the recipient's life, beginning
with a neonatal examination, up to the age at which an individual is
no longer eligible for EPSDT services." 3 Services must be provided
more frequently to the extent medically necessary for any individual
child.4 °
Illinois, for example, has adopted a periodicity schedule that
tracks the recommendations of the American Academy of
Pediatricians and incorporates the nationally recognized schedule for

34 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 441.56 (1984) (defining EPSDT required

activities).
35 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1) (1965).
36

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(2-4); 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(b)-(c).

37 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)-(4).
38 42 C.F.R.

§ 441.58.

39 42 C.F.R. § 441.58(b); see also THE STATE MEDICAID MANUAL

§ 5140

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45-smm/pub45toc.asp?

(last

available

at

modified Sept. 16, 2004).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(A)(ii).
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immunizations. 4 1 The Illinois periodicity schedule calls for seven
appointments for health screening services in the first year of life,
four appointments in the second year of life, and a decreasing number
of annual appointments as a child becomes older.42 Under the
periodicity schedule, a child should receive additional examinations
if medically necessary. Illinois also calls for annual vision, hearing,
and dental screens, and two blood lead screens, one at twelve and one
at twenty-four months of age.
Consistent with the language of the EPSDT provisions, state
law generally requires that children receive immunizations
appropriate for a child's age and health history. These requirements
are frequently adapted from recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices ("ACIP") of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), the American Academy of
Pediatrics ("AAP"), and the American Academy of Family
Physicians ("AAFP"). a3
3. Children Are Entitled To Follow-Up Services
A state program also must ensure that once a screening
identifies a certain condition that requires corrective services the state
must provide that child with follow-up corrective services.4 4 The
states also must provide all care, treatment, services or other
measures that are medically necessary to address any conditions that
are discovered through the screening and diagnostic services under
EPSDT.a5
Congress conferred the right to EPSDT services on every
recipient child, and reinforced this intent by expressly instructing the
Secretary of HHS to "develop and set annual participation goals for
each State for participation of individuals who are covered under the
State plan under this subchapter in early and periodic screening,

41 89 11.
Admin. Code § 140.488.
42

Id.

43 See, e.g. 89 111. Admin. Code § 140.488 (adopting specific periodicity

schedule based on scheduled promulgated by the American Academy of
Pediatrics).
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(C) (explaining how states are required to
"arrange for (directly or through referral to appropriate agencies, organizations or
individuals) corrective treatment, the need for which is disclosed by... child
health screening services"). See also Bond v. Stanton, 655 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1981).
45 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
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diagnostic, and treatment services., 46 The Secretary established a
schedule of goals in the State Medicaid Manual in 1990, directing the
states to show by 1995 a "participant ratio" and a "screening ratio" of
eighty percent each.4 7 The "participant ratio" measures how many of
the children eligible for EPSDT services in a particular year received
at least one service. The "screening ratio" measures the extent to
which eligible children scheduled to receive at least one service in a
given year actually receive services. As noted above, young children
are scheduled to receive many more than one per year.
These goals indicate that the Secretary, charged with the
implementation of the statute, interprets the statute to entitle every
eligible child to the full EPSDT comprehensive health program.
Further, the Secretary requires, as a matter of federal-state
accountability, that states evidence compliance with this entitlement
by producing success in eighty percent of the cases.4 8
4. States Must Actively Advance the Children's Use of
EPSDT Services
The Medicaid Act requires that the states provide information
49
to recipients that effectively promotes the use of EPSDT services.
The Medicaid regulations require that the states inform recipients
about the EPSDT program and its benefits using both written and oral
methods.5 ° States must not just perfunctorily provide information
about the program; the state's efforts must be "effective"-they must
sell the plan in a way that gets children to participate51 in what the Act
intends to be a comprehensive child health program.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
47 THE STATE MEDICAID MANUAL § 5360(B) and (C) available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smn/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004).
48 See Salazar v. D.C., 954 F. Supp. 278, 304-06 (D.D.C. 1996) (discussing
the district's failure to achieve participation goals constituted evidence of district's
failure to deliver EPSDT services to eligible poor children).
49 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A).
50 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(1).

51 Id.; see also Memisovski, 2004 WL 1878332 *91

("These EPSDT

requirements differ from merely providing 'access' to services; the Medicaid
statute places affirmative obligations on states to assure that these services are
actually provided to children on Medicaid in a timely and effective manner.");
Salazar, 954 F. Supp. at 318-23, 333 (showing where district violated EPSDT
statute by failing to provide effective notice of EPSDT to children who are eligible
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Consistently, the regulations instruct the states to sell the
program to its intended beneficiaries in various ways: they must use
"clear, non-technical language," inform people of the services
available and where and how to obtain them, and of "the benefits of
preventive health care," and invite them to request transportation
services and help with scheduling medical appointments. States
must "effectively inform" those who are blind or deaf or who cannot
read or understand the English language. 53 States must act promptly
and monitor their caseloads regarding EPSDT; and they must provide
assurance to CMS that "processes are in place to effectively inform
individuals .... 54
The State Medicaid Manual provides further prescriptions
about the "informing" requirement in 42 U.S.C. section
1396a(a)(43)(A). It instructs the states to "[u]se methods of
communication that recipients can clearly and easily understand to
ensure that they have the information they need to utilize services to
which they are entitled., 55 Oral methods are expressly required by the
Medicaid Act, and these methods
include face-to-face
communications from eligibility workers, health aides, and providers,
for those services, failing to monitor whether social services staff inform patients
about EPSDT services or take other appropriate action to ensure that eligible
families are informed about EPSDT); Stanton, 504 F.2d at 1250 ("The mandatory
obligation upon each participating state to aggressively notify, seek out and screen
persons under 21 in order to detect health problems and to pursue those problems
with the needed treatment is made unambiguously clear by the 1967 act and by the
interpretative regulations and guidelines."); see also 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(1) ("The
[state] agency must--(1) Provide for a combination of written and oral methods
designed to inform effectively all EPSDT eligible individuals (or their families)
about the EPSDT program.") (emphasis added).
52 See 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 441.62 (requiring the provision of
transportation and scheduling services); see also THE STATE MEDICAID MANUAL §
5150 available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45-smm/pub45toc.asp? (last
modified Sept. 16, 2004) ("To ensure that recipients obtain needed Medicaid
services, offer and provide, if requested and necessary, assistance with
transportation and scheduling appointments .... Offer both transportation and
scheduling assistance prior to each due date of a child's periodic examination.
Provide this assistance if requested and necessary.").
" 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(3); see also Salazar, 954 F. Supp. at 320 (declaring
that written forms available only in English were inadequate notice to illiterate and
non-English speaking recipients).
'4

42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(4).

55 THE
STATE
MEDICAID
MANUAL
§ 5121(A) available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smni/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004).
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plus public service announcements, community awareness campaigns
and audio and visual methods. 56 It is "effective and efficient" to tailor
these methods to particular at-risk groups.57
The State Medicaid Manual sums up its result-oriented set of
"informing" duties in this way: "[States] have the flexibility to
determine how information may be given most appropriately while
assuring that every EPSDT eligible receives58 the basic information
necessary to gain access to EPSDT services."
Whether the informational strategies a state employs comply
with the practical, result-oriented "informing" requirements of the
EPSDT scheme is properly measured not only by the objective
reasonableness of each strategy but ultimately by the overall results.
Eligible children are not being "effectively" informed--even if they
receive a few flyers in the mail-if significant numbers of them are
not accessing services according to the periodicity schedule (or at
all) .59
5. States Must Follow-Up With Those Children Who Are
Not Receiving Care
The states are obligated to increase their efforts for any
families that "have not used services." 60 This necessarily requires that
the states monitor the healthcare provided to each child and that the
states follow-up with every child that does not receive services. The
states have an obligation to monitor the level of healthcare actually
61
provided
them improve
their performance.
states
do not
know howto help
the program
is performing
with respectIf to
individual

56

See

THE

STATE MEDICAID

MANUAL,

supra note 55; 42 U.S.C §

1396a(a)(43)(A).
57 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(43)(A).
58 THE

STATE

MEDICAID

MANUAL

§

5121(C)

available

at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smm/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004) (emphasis added).
59 See Salazar, 954 F. Supp. at 320 (declaring that low percentage of recipients
who expressed desire for EPSDT services was evidence that District's use of
recertification form was an ineffective tool for informing Medicaid recipients about
EPSDT).
42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a)(4).
61 See Salazar, 1997 WL 306876, at *10-11 (requiring the district to establish
a tracking system to assure that all Medicaid-eligible children receive all ageappropriate screens, services and follow-up treatment).
60
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recipients of EPSDT services, the failure to 62monitor the program is
itself a violation of the EPSDT requirements.
To achieve an "effective child health program" the states are
required to take a practical, pro-active and result-oriented approach to
the screening requirements of the EPSDT program. According to the
State Medicaid Manual, the initial EPSDT examination
[M]ay be requested at any time, and must be provided
without regard to whether the individual's age coincides
with the established periodicity schedule. Sound medical
practice requires that when children first enter the EPSDT
program you [the state] encourage and promote that they
receive the full panoply of screening services available
under EPSDT. It is desirable that a parent or other
responsible adult accompany the child to the examination.
When this is not possible or practical, arrange for a followup worker, social worker, health aide, or neighborhood
worker to discuss the results in a 63
visit to the home or in
contacts with the family elsewhere.
The Seventh Circuit has held that a technical and bureaucratic
approach to the concept of a "request" for services is inconsistent
with the result-oriented and practical approach embodied in the
Medicaid Act.64 According to the court:
Indiana's somewhat casual approach to EPSDT hardly
conforms to the aggressive search for early detection of
child health problems envisaged by Congress. It is difficult
enough to activate the average affluent adult to seek
medical assistance until he is virtually laid low. It is utterly

62

See Bond, 655 F.2d at 770-771 (showing where the state violated EPSDT

statute in failing to monitor whether complete screening services are being
performed on EPSDT-eligible children); see also Salazar, 954 F. Supp. at 329
(noting the agency's failure to respond to parental requests for EPSDT services for
their children, failure to conduct site visits to monitor providers serving EPSDTeligible children, and lack of data collection requirements or organized system for
receiving feedback from providers and for enforcing those requirements evidenced
district's failure to monitor whether EPSDT-eligible children receive complete
screening services).
63 THE
STATE
MEDICAID
MANUAL
§ 5123.1(B) available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45 smm/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004).
64 Stanton, 504 F.2d at 1251.
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beyond belief to expect that children of needy parents will
volunteer themselves or that their parents will voluntarily
deliver them to the providers of health services for early
medical screenings and diagnosis. By the time an Indiana
child is brought for treatment it may too often be on a
stretcher. This is hardly 6the goal of 'early and periodic
screening and diagnosis.'
In this context, case management services are a key strategy
states should employ to achieve the results required in EPSDT. Case
management "centers on the process of collecting information on the
health needs of the child, making-and following up on-referrals as
needed, maintaining a health history, and activating the
examination/diagnosis/treatment loop." 66 It "provides the difference"
in achieving the goal of the program: instead of fragmentation and
children falling through cracks, there is "a comprehensive program
based on the concept of getting 67children into the existing mainstream
system of health care delivery."
Case management is particularly effective in helping the state
to accomplish the "integral responsibility" of notifying recipients
each time they are due to receive an EPSDT screening. 6-While case
management is not in itself specifically mandated by the statute, its
absence or under-use in a state that has significant numbers of
children not receiving EPSDT services according to the periodicity
schedule or at all is evidence of a program that69 does not comply with
the result-oriented requirements of the statute.
See Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 606-12 (E.D. Tex. 2000), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 123 S.Ct. 1481 (U.S. 2003)
(rejecting state's argument that state is responsible for providing EPSDT services to
only those Medicaid recipients' who technically request them; recipients'
entitlement to services is not dependent upon a formalized type of request).
65

66 THE

STATE

MEDICAID

MANUAL

§

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_snm/pub45toc.asp?

5310(D)

available

at

(last modified Sept. 16,

2004).
67 Id.
68 THE

STATE

MEDICAID

MANUAL

§

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smm/pub45toc.asp?

5310(D)

available

at

(last modified Sept. 16,

2004).
69 See Id. § 5010(B) ("Although 'case management' does not appear in
statutory provisions pertaining to the EPSDT benefit, the concept has been
recognized as a means of increasing program efficiency and effectiveness by
assuring that needed services are provided timely and efficiently, and that
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The "arranging for treatment" component of the EPSDT
program in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(C) is also result-oriented. The
states must provide any and all diagnostic and treatment services
allowed under the federal Medicaid scheme to address needs
indicated by the screens, regardless of whether the state has opted to
provide those services to adult Medicaid recipients. 70 To ensure that
treatment is provided according to this requirement, states are
instructed to "[t]ake advantage of all resources available. Make
arrangements with providers, including physicians practicing 7in1
individual or group settings, for the delivery of EPSDT services.
There is no limitation with respect to specialists. If treatment services
are indicated based on the screens and among those provided for in
the federal Medicaid scheme, the state must provide them to children.
States may contract with HMOs to provide EPSDT services to
72
eligible children enrolled with the organization. To the extent a
state contracts with an HMO, the contract must provide for certain
quality assurance measures including "maintenance of sufficient
patient encounter data to identify the physician who delivers services
to patients., 73 States also must ensure through their contracts that
each MCO maintain a "health information system" that collects data
on enrollee and provider characteristics and on "services furnished to
enrollees through an encounter data system." 74 Ultimately, however,
the states remain accountable for the provision of EPSDT services,
and must monitor these activities and enforce these contractual
75
provisions in order to assure that they are fully carried out.

duplicated and unnecessary services are avoided."); see also Bond, 655 F.2d at 771;
John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786, 802-803 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (stating
emphatically: "Without proper outreach, EPSDT is worthless.").
70 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(c) (2005).

§ 5220(A) available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/45_smm/pub45toc.asp? (last modified Sept. 16,
2004).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
71 THE

STATE

MEDICAID

MANUAL

7'

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(l)(A)(xi).

74

42 C.F.R. § 438.242(a) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 438.242(b)(1).

71 See John B., 176 F. Supp. 2d at 801-802 (stating that state contractors'
failure to follow federal EPSDT requirements did not relieve State of its
responsibilities; "EPSDT cannot be simply relinquished to the MCOs, as the State
remains ultimately bound by the EPSDT regulations."); see supra Part I(A).
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III. Many States Are Violating the Rights of Health
Care Consumers on Medicaid
In order to comply with the Medicaid Act, including the
Equal Access and EPSDT provisions, states must devote significant
resources to the poor. Many states, however are under-funding their
Medicaid programs. While one cannot judge a state's compliance
with the Medicaid Act solely by reference to the reimbursement rates
that the state pays to medical providers, those rates are an objective
indicator of a state's commitment to complying with its obligations
under the Equal Access and EPSDT provisions. The rate structure of
many states is dramatically below any applicable market rates.
In Memisovski v. Patla, a recent Equal Access and EPSDT
case, Illinois took the position that it was complying with the
Medicaid Act because its results were no worse than other industrial
states. In its court filings, Illinois made no effort to analyze whether
those other states were complying with the Medicaid Act, but instead
argued solely that its results were not out of line with the nation.
While the Court had little difficulty in barring Illinois from even
presenting evidence to support this argument, based on the fact that
Illinois did not analyze whether these other states were, in fact,
complying with the Medicaid Act, this type of argument suggests that
states will not always employ a rigorous and proper analysis of their
compliance with the Medicaid Act.

IV. The Medicaid Act Should Be Enforceable Under
Section 1983
Plaintiffs have attempted to enforce the Equal Access and
EPSDT Provisions in cases across the country. One of the more
hotly-contested issues is whether recipients can enforce these
provisions under Section 1983. The better conclusion is that
See Memisovski ex rel. v. Patla, No. 92 C 1982, 2001 WL 1249615, at *1113 (N.D. Ill. 2001)(asserting violations of equal access and EPSDT); see also
Methodist Hosp. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting violations of
equal access); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th
Cir. 2000) (asserting violations of equal access; Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10
F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting violations of EPSDT); Westside Mothers et al.
v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002) (asserting violations of equal access and
EPSDT), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1045 (2002); Bond v. Stanton, 655 F.2d 766 (7th
Cir. 1981) (asserting violations of EPSDT); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572
(E.D.Cal 1990) (asserting violations of equal access and EPSDT); Salazar v. D.C.,
No. CA-93-452, 1997 WL 306876 (D.D.C. 1997) (asserting violations of EPSDT).
76
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recipients can do SO. 77 Congress clearly intended to benefit Medicaid
recipients when it enacted the EPSDT and equal access provisions.78
States have argued that the Supreme Court ruling in Gonzaga
University v. Doe,79 bars private citizens from bringing any claim
Act. 80
under Section 1983 to enforce their rights under the Medicaid
This argument would require a significant expansion of the actual
holding of Gonzaga.
The Supreme Court expressly upheld the enforceability of
rights under the Medicaid Act through Section 1983 in Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Association.8 1 In Wilder, the Supreme Court held
that the now repealed "Boren Amendment" to Section 1396a of the
Medicaid Act did provide health care providers with enforceable
rights that could be enforced pursuant to Section 1983, and strongly
rejected the contention that "Congress has foreclosed enforcement of
the Medicaid Act under § 1983. "82 The Boren Amendment is
analogous to the Equal Access provision, and the Boren Amendment
required states to set reimbursement rates for certain institutional
medical providers which were "reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs" of operating such facilities. 83 The Wilder Court held that this
provision created rights enforceable under Section 1983 because it
was (1) clearly intended to benefit the specified institutional
providers, (2) phrased in mandatory terms, and (3) sufficiently
77 See Memisovski, 2001 WL 124615, at *5 (stating that the provisions satisfy
the traditional three-factor test that gives rise to a federal right, and citing case law
holding that "violations of the statutory provisions requiring EPSDT services are
redressable through 1983").
78 Id. at *11-13. See also Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029
(7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing § 1396a(a)(30)); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc.
v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 924 (5th Cir. 2000) (analyzing § 1396a(a)(30)); Miller by
Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1316 (7th Cir. 1993) (analyzing § 1396a(a)(43));
Westside Mothers et al. v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 862-63 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1045 (2002) (analyzing § 1396a(a)(43) and 1396d(r)); Bond v.
Stanton, 655 F.2d 766, 767-768 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforcing predecessor provision to
§ 1396a(a)(43)); and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (quoting Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) ("[S]uits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to
secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of
participating States.").
79 536 U.S. 271 (2002).
80 See e.g. Memisovski v. Patla, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332.
81

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990).

82

Id. at 520, 524.

83

See id. at 503 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)).
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definite to be judicially enforceable. 84 This three-part test was further
established by Blessing v. Freestone,85 which rejected certain
Section 1983 suits brought under Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, and has since been known as the "Blessing test."
As noted by the Third Circuit in Sabree v. Richman, the
Gonzaga decision "carefully avoided disturbing, much less
overruling" cases such as Wilder.87 As such, an assessment of
whether rights are enforceable under Section 1983 must still include
an evaluation of the three-part test set forth in Wilder and Blessing, as
further construed by Gonzaga. What Gonzaga clarified within that
test was that it is not sufficient that a plaintiff fall "within the general
zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect," but rather the
statute must set forth an "unambiguously conferred right" to be
protected pursuant to Section1983.8- This involves an assessment of
the text and structure of the statute to determine whether
the statute in
89
question contains, e.g., "rights-creating language."
Recent cases, such as Sabree, have made clear that even under
the heightened standard articulated by Gonzaga, the provisions of
Section 1396a of the Medicaid Act continue to be enforceable
through Section 1983 actions. In Sabree, the Third Circuit engaged in
an extensive examination of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1396a(a)(8),
1396a(a)(10), and 1396d(a)(15) in light of Gonzaga, and concluded
that these sections did include "unambiguously conferred rights,"
enshrined within the statute by "rights-creating language" with an
"unmistakable" individual focus on Medicaid-eligible individuals. 90
Both of the specific provisions of the Medicaid Act at issue
here pass this test. More recently, in Memisovski v. Patla, Judge
Lefkow conducted an extensive analysis of the Equal Access and
EPSDT provisions in light of Gonzaga. She concluded that, after

85

Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510-520.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).

86

Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004).

84

Id. at 184; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280-81 (noting
that Wilder addressed a provision of the Medicaid Act as to which "Congress left
no doubt of its intent for private enforcement"); see also id. at 290 (noting that
FERPA's administrative enforcement procedures "squarely distinguish this case
from... Wilder").
88 See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283.
87

89

Id. at 286-87.

90 See Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190-92.
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Gonzaga, 42 U.S.C. section 1396a(a)(30)(A), and the EPSDT
provisions unambiguously confer rights on plaintiffs supporting a
cause of action brought under Section 1983.9 There is no reason to
believe that Gonzaga implicitly overruled the consistent line of
authority holding that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act
create rights enforceable under Section 1983.92

V. Conclusion
Millions of children and adults are entitled to benefits under
the Medicaid Act. Congress has mandated that these individuals have
access to medical care that is equal to the access enjoyed by the
general population in the applicable geographic region. The general
population for these purposes consists of persons with private health
insurance. In virtually all cases, reimbursement rates are a critical
factor in providing such access.
Congress also has mandated that with respect to children,
states must go further than providing access. States must employ
effective notification techniques and outreach so that they succeed in
providing children with a full set of health care services. To the
extent that a state fails to comply with these mandates, Section 1983
should provide an appropriate vehicle for pursuing a remedy.

91 Memisovski, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332, at *5 (2004).
92 See, e.g., Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't. of Human Servs., 293
F.3d 472, 479 (8th Cir. 2002); Westside Mothers et al, 289 F.3d at 863 , cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 1045 (2002).

